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Electric Currents:
Programming Legal Status into
Autonomous Unmanned Maritime
Vehicles
Daniel A.G. Vallejo 1
The use of autonomous vehicles in the ocean is a recent
phenomenon, which challenges the notions of what can and
cannot be done on the battlefield. One of these challenges is
defining these vehicles in the proper legal framework, a
challenge made harder by their lack of human control. This note
seeks to establish a new definition for these autonomous
maritime vehicles within the context of maritime law, establish a
standard of liability for the vehicles, and provide guidance on
whether or not these vehicles can comply with the collision
regulations of the ocean.
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I. Introduction
In 2011, the United States Department of Defense’s Office of
Naval Research awarded Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University a research grant for “understanding the jellyfish propulsion
and feeding mechanisms to bioengineer autonomous vehicles. 2“ Two
years later, the university’s research team began testing the
capabilities of a 170-pound, 5-foot-7 jellyfish robot named Cyro. 3
Perhaps the most impressive thing about Cyro is how life-like it is.
The machine is not only designed to look like a real jellyfish, but Cyro
also has nearly the same autonomous capabilities as a real jellyfish.
Unlike previous models that were tethered, Cyro is designed to go
months without any human intervention, powered only on a tiny
hydride battery. 4 Once deployed, Cyro will be used to further develop
our understanding of the ocean: it will study marine life, map the
ocean floor, and monitor ocean currents. 5 However, its primary
function will be maritime surveillance. 6
Ten years ago, the idea of Cyro seemed like a fantasy out of an
Asimov novel. 7 However, since the rise of “drone” unmanned aerial
vehicles in the War on Terror, the United States has been looking to
use other types of unmanned machines in different fronts of combat
and defense. 8 The benefits of this new approach are less American
2.

Press Release, U.S. Ass’t Sec. Def. for Res. & Eng’g, $37.8 Million
Awarded to Universities for Research Equipment (July 11, 2011),
available
at http://www.acq.osd.mil/chieftechnologist/publications/
docs/FY11_DURIP_Press_Releasel.pdf
[hereinafter
ASD
Press
Release].

3.

Natalie DiBlasio, Man-Sized Jellyfish Robot to Roam the Ocean, USA
TODAY, (Mar. 31, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/sciencefair/2013/03/31/giant-jellyfish-robot-cyro/2039843/.

4.

Virginia Tech Researchers Unveil Large Robotic Jellyfish That One Day
Could Patrol Oceans, VA. TECH NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2013/04/040313-engineeringrobotjellyfishcyro.html [hereinafter Virginia Tech].

5.

Id.

6.

Marine surveillance consists of UMVs surveying the ocean floor and
protecting US territory from infiltration and piracy. See id.

7.

Isaac Asimov was a popular science fiction writer whose work often
dealt possibilities of humans dealing with advanced autonomous robots.
See generally ISAAC ASIMOV, I ROBOT (1950).

8.

The War on Terror is an ongoing conflict that began after the terrorist
attacks of 9/11. After the attacks, President George W. Bush authorized
the use of drones, and drone usage has been an ongoing method of
combating terrorists and ensuring national security. See generally
Milena Sterio, The United States’ Use of Drone in the War on Terror:
The (Il)Legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 197 (2012); see also Craig Whitlock, U.S. Military
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military fatalities and more cost-effective ways for the military to
monitor interested areas. As a result, the Navy started developing
Unmanned Marine Vehicles (hereinafter UMVs), which included
unmanned surface vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles. 9 In
2007, the US Navy released The Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master
Plan, detailing how the machines are to be developed, maintained,
used, and defined in terms of operation. 10 Yet, the Plan does not
define the legal status of the unmanned surface vehicles. The Navy
has been vague on properly giving a legal definition to these types of
vehicles, defining UMVs as “craft,” a term which itself is undefined. 11
To make matters even murkier, the Navy has determined that UMV
status is not dependent on the definitional “status of its launch
platform.” 12
The difficulty with defining Unmanned Maritime Vehicles is
critical in assessing their functions and privileges while operating in
the ocean. Furthermore, even if autonomous UMVs fit into a legal
framework, there is still the problem of determining whether they
should fall within the authority of the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) 13, and if so, how to properly
ensure that they comply with those rules. Because UMVs will be
operating in waters with manned craft, it is important to make sure
they follow some set of navigation rules. The problem here is how to
make them abide when they do not fit in the current definition of
what a “vessel” is, as well as determining is UMVs should be given
“vessel” status in the first place.
This Note seeks to put an end to this debate by arguing for
autonomous UMVs to be defined as “military devices” and not as
“vessels” or “ships.” As such, autonomous UMV will not have to
comply with the COLREGS as they are written. Instead, they should
be held to a different standard of navigational rules due to their
advanced technology and autonomy. This Note presents a unique and

Drone Surveillance is Expanding to Hot Spots Beyond Declared Combat
Zones, WASH. POST (Jul. 20, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2013-07-20/world/40695383_1_drone-bases-unarmed-drones-droneattacks
9.

See U.S. NAVY DEP’T, THE NAVY UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLE (USV)
MASTER PLAN, x-xi (2007) [hereinafter USV Master Plan].

10.

See id.

11.

U.S. NAVY DEP’T, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, 2.3.4, 2.3.5 (2007)

12.

Id. at 2.3.6. (2007).

13.

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, opened for signature Oct. 20, 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter
COLREGS].
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novel approach to giving Unmanned Marine Vehicles a new status as
“military devices.”
This Note begins in Part II by providing background information
on the Navy’s development of UMVs, as well as the COLREGS
themselves. Next, Part III discusses the definitional problems facing
legal classification, and argues that autonomous UMVs should not be
classified as “vessels” or “ships.” Defining UMVs as “vessels” or
“ships” would be impossible the way the COLREGS are currently
written. Further, amending the COLREGS would not be in the best
interest of time because the military will most likely deploy UMVs
before the regulations can be amended. Part IV then examines tort
liability of UMVs: whether or not UMVs have a duty of care to other
ships, establishing the standard of negligence of a UMV, and
establishing liability in the case of an accident. Finally, Part V
examines the way UMVs will navigate free of the COLREGS, and
addresses safety concerns.

II. Background
While the military’s use of autonomous weaponry is nothing new,
the high level of the autonomy seen in UMVs is the key factor in
causing controversy on how to classify the vehicles. Not only does the
history of UMVs have to be discussed, but also the history and
purpose of the COLREGS. Understanding these two main elements
will make the analysis on harmonizing the two a much easier task.
A. The History of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles

The US Navy’s interest in UMVs has spiked in recent years;
however, research in the capabilities of autonomous watercrafts has
been ongoing for years. In 1993, the MIT Sea Grant College Program
developed an autonomous surface craft called ARTEMIS, a small
“scale replica of a fishing trawler.” 14 This model proved to be too
small to endure autonomy for longer periods of time, and subsequent
models that came out of MIT were larger, such as a programmed
kayak fitted with an acoustic tracking system used to follow tagged
fish. 15 The early development of UMVs was mostly in an academic
setting, created for oceanic research. It was during these years of
academic research that the Navy took notice of these projects’
potential.
While the Navy’s first focus of development was on the unmanned
underwater vehicles, the publishing of its 2007 Master Plan focuses
14.

J.E. Manley, Unmanned Surface Vehicles, 15 Years of Development,
Battelle Applied Coastal and Environmental Services, OCEANS 2008
CONFERENCE (Sept. 15-18 2008).

15.

Id.

408

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Legal Status of Autonomous Unmanned Maritime Vehicles

strictly on unmanned surface vehicles. 16 This is mostly because
unmanned surface vehicles serve as a facilitator for operation of other
unmanned vehicles: they can relay radio frequency transmission above
to unmanned aerial vehicles and other aircraft, and below to
unmanned underwater vehicles and other sea vessels. 17 The
functionality of UMVs varies, but the Navy intends to use them for
harbor and sea security, mine sweeping, sea exploration, and
eventually to engage in combat and active defense. 18
Within the framework of UMVs exist varying levels of
autonomous functionality, based on how “unmanned” different classes
of UMVs actually are. The Navy has defined each level of autonomy
as follows:
•Manual- Man in loop continuously or near-continuously
•Semi-Autonomous- some vehicle behaviors are completely
autonomous (e.g., transit to station, activate sensors). Vehicle
refers to its operator when directed by the operator or by its
own awareness of the situation (e.g., for permission to fire).
•Autonomous or Fully Autonomous- The vehicle governs its
own decisions and makes its own decisions from launch to
recovery point. 19

For the purposes of this Note, all UMVs referred to from here on
out will be categorized under the third classification, “Autonomous or
Fully Autonomous.” Under the current language of the COLREGS
and other applicable frameworks, such as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the first two categories may be
easier to classify than the third, as discussed in Section III of the note.
B. The COLREGS and the International Maritime Organization

The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
informally known as The COLREGS, are a set of rules enacted in
1972 that apply “to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters
connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.” 20 The COLREGS
are made up of 38 rules divided into five different sections: general
16.

The difference is that unmanned underwater vehicles are submarines,
and unmanned surface vehicles are more like boats in that they cannot
go under the surface of the ocean. UMVs have both capabilities. Id.

17.

Id.

18.

CAPT. ANDREW NORRIS, LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO UNMANNED
MARITIME SYSTEMS
1–2,
available
at
https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=731705.

19.

See USV Master Plan, supra note 8.

20.

COLREGS, supra note 12, at rule 1(a).

409

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Legal Status of Autonomous Unmanned Maritime Vehicles

rules, steering and sailing, lights and shapes, sound and light signals,
and exemptions. 21 The International Maritime Organization (IMO)
contends that a particularly important aspect of the COLREGS was
“the recognition given to traffic separation schemes” in Rule 10,
which outlines ways to determine safe speed and collision risk, and
outlines the conduct of vessels operating around traffic separation
schemes. 22 In addition to the rules, there are Annexes providing
technical details. 23
The COLREGS have been amended a number of times, most
recently in 2007 when Annex IV regarding distress signals was
rewritten. 24 The amending process is time consuming and complex.
Simply put, proposed amendments must go through a “tacit
acceptance” procedure, where amendments can enter into force
between 18 to 24 months after proposal unless the amendment is
objected to by a specific number of parties. 25 The COLREGS were
amended in 1981 and 1987. 26 The COLREGS were ratified by the
United States in 1977. 27

III. Defining UMVs
UMVs are sea craft built to navigate the ocean and provide
defense on maritime fronts. 28 The navigational regulations spelled out
in the COLREGS are written to only apply to “vessels.” 29 To say that
there is an implicit connection here and that UMVs fall within the
guidance of the COLREGS is an easy assumption to make, but would
ultimately cause confusion upon a deeper analysis. The COLREGS
have specific definitions of what classifies as a “vessel,” and have
21.

List of Conventions—COLREGS, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.
org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/COLREG.aspx (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter IMO and the COLREGS].

22.

Id.

23.

See COLREGS, supra note 12, at annex I-IV.

24.

COLREGS—Preventing Collisions at Sea, INTL MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/PreventingCollisions.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).

25.

See Introduction: Adopting a Convention, Entry into Force, Accession,
Amendment, Enforcement, Tacit Acceptance Procedure, INT’L MAR.
ORG., http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/pages/home.aspx (last
visited March 16, 2014) [hereinafter IMO Procedure].

26.

See IMO and the COLREGS, supra note 20.

27.

Id.

28.

See Virginia Tech, supra note 3.

29.

See COLREGS, supra note 12, at rule 1 (“These rules shall apply to all
vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connecter therewith
navigable by seagoing vessels.”).

410

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Legal Status of Autonomous Unmanned Maritime Vehicles

stringent qualifications that “vessels” must meet in order to fall under
this classification. 30 In order to determine whether UMVs qualify as
“vessels” under the COLREGS, the language of the rules must be
thoroughly examined. If UMVs do not in fact qualify as vessels then
further analysis is necessary to fit them into a particular legal status.
A. UMVs as “Vessels” and “Ships”

The term “vessel” appears frequently in the COLREGS. In fact,
the regulations only apply to “vessels” as stated in the definitions of
the regulations. 31 “Vessels” are defined in Rule 3(a) of the COLREGS,
which states “the world ‘vessel’ includes every description of water
craft, including non-displacement craft, WIG craft 32 and seaplanes,
used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on
water.” 33 The term “ship” is not defined in the COLREGS, but is
defined in another IMO treaty, the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”). That convention
defines a “ship” as “a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the
marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles,
submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms.” 34 Because
the same international organization, the IMO, is responsible for the
implementation and interpretation of both these treaties, and because
the COLREGS preceded MARPOL, there exists a strong implication
that when defining “ships” the IMO had the previously established
definition of “vessels” as a baseline. Thus, the term “ship is
presupposed to fall under the definition of a “vessel.” 35
Defining a UMV within these terms proves troublesome. Perhaps
the largest problem with according UMVs the status of “vessels” is
the fact that a “vessel” must be used as a means of transportation.
Current UMVs in design are not for transportation means; The Navy
is developing UMVs mainly for reconnaissance purposes, but also as

30.

The definitions section of the COLREGS defines 12 types of “vessels”
and their various components. See COLREGS, supra note 12, at rule
3(a).

31.

Id.

32.

WIG (Wing-In-Ground) crafts are machines operated by aerodynamic
forces that allow them to operate at low altitudes above sea surface, and
do not have any direct contact with the sea. See Wing In Ground
(WIG) Craft, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/ OurWork/
Safety/Regulations/Pages/WIG.aspx (last visited March 16, 2014).

33.

See COLREGS, supra note 12, at rule 1(a).

34.

See NORRIS, supra note 17, at 24.

35.

Capt. Norris says these definitions are interchangeable, while I maintain
that they are not interchangeable but one is built upon the other. See
id.
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tools for maritime exploration and scientific development. 36 Perhaps in
the future UMVs will be used to transport goods and people, but this
is not currently the case.
Some scholars argue that because some UMVs carry weapons and
other tools, this qualifies them under the “transportation”
requirement for vessel status. 37 This is stretching the definition of
“transportation” too thin. If a UMV, or any other vehicle is carrying
a weapon, the purpose of carrying such a weapon is to deploy it in the
case of an altercation or for other purposes of defense. The purpose of
maintaining weapons onboard is not to transport them from one
destination to the next. While it is true that the weapon deployed has
an ultimate destination, the intended target, the actual physical
weapon (which in this case would be a missile or torpedo) would be
destroyed upon impact, as well as the missile’s intended target. If this
definition was expanded as some advocate, then perhaps warships
could also be construed as cargo ships, and that would cause friction
in other areas of international law, such as rules regulating what can
and cannot be shipped through international waters. 38
When other sections of the COLREGS are applied to UMVs,
another definitional problem comes to light. In the regulations it is
implied that a “vessel” is one that is controlled by a human, as in a
human steers it and makes decisions for the machine. This is
evidenced by other treaties promulgated by the IMO. The definitions
found in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(“SOLAS”), for example, applies only to passenger ships of more than
12 passengers, cargo ships, tankers, fishing vessels, nuclear ships (a
ship provided with a nuclear power plant), “new ships” (ships of the
keel created after the date of the Convention), or ships that existed
before the creation of the Convention. 39 Another example is the IMO’s
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (“STCW”). 40 The whole purpose of that
Convention is to ensure that people are trained to abide by certain
rules of merchant ships. 41 Clearly these treaties were not written with
36.

DiBlasio, supra note 2.

37.

See Norris, supra note 17, at 49 (“Unfortunately, there is no universally
accepted understanding of ‘means of transportation on water.’”).

38.

See, e.g., Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, A/Res/40/72
(1985).

39.

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, reg. 2, opened for
signature Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278.

40.

See generally International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, STCW/CONF.2/33
(1985).

41.

See Generally COLREGS, supra note 12.
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the possibility of Unmanned Marine Vehicles in mind. This means
other statuses must be considered.
B. UMVs as “Warships”

Another possible consideration of status for Unmanned Marine
Vehicles is to classify them as “warships.” UNCLOS defines a warship
as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the
external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the
State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its
equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed
forces discipline.” 42 Because Unmanned Marine Vehicles are owned by
the military and will be used primarily for reconnaissance purposes, it
is easy to think of these as warships under the current UNCLOS
definitions. 43 However, once the definition is examined a number of
issues arise that make this a difficult status to confer upon Unmanned
Marine Vehicles.
The precise language of the statute describes a warship as being
“under the command of an officer,” and “manned by a crew which is
under regular forces discipline.” 44 The statutory requirement that the
ship be “manned by a crew” disqualifies UMVs from this definition, as
UMVs are not “manned” by a crew, but programmed to function
autonomously. Furthermore, because of the strict autonomy of the
vehicle, the question of how a UMV is “commanded” becomes even
murkier. Is the vehicle commanded when it is programmed or when it
is launched? Starting the point of command when the vehicle is
programmed may make more logical sense than when the
programmed vehicle is launched from the ship. However if this is the
case, then technically the person who commanded the vehicle would
be the programmer uploading the command data rather than the
commander who merely tells the programmer which data to input
into the machine. Further, there would be no set commands if the
machine had to make decisions that the crew could not account for,
such as dealing with certain types of sea-life. In this case, there is a
possibility the machine could compute to make on its own due to its
high level of autonomy. Because of these issues, the option of giving
Unmanned Marine Vehicles warship status should be abandoned.

42.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 10 1882), art.
29, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]

43.

Id.

44.

Id.
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C. UMVs as “Military Devices”

Another school of thought does not define UMVs as “vessels,” but
seeks to find another category of legal status to assign to the vehicles.
While there are many different avenues of classifying UMVs, the
easiest and most logical way to do so would be to call them “military
devices.” There are several definitional and policy reasons behind
calling UMVs “military devices.” While this is a new area of law and
is still being developed, classifying UMVs, as “military devices,” will
not only save time but is the best choice of status as to avoid conflict
in the international law community.
Classifying UMVs as “military devices” when defining the term is
the most simple way possible. The UMVs are owned and being funded
by the Navy. 45 Because we cannot call these vehicles “vessels” under
the current definition outlined by the COLREGS, referring to UMVs
as “military devices” makes the most sense categorically. However,
this alone cannot qualify “military devices” as a status for UMVs. In
order to come up with a solid definition, we must first look to current
law regarding the term.
“Military device” is currently not a term of art under
international law. However, the term has been defined in the
American legal system. Section 845 of Title 18 of the United States
Code defines “military devices” as, but does not restrict its definition
to, “shells, bombs, projectiles, mines, missiles, rockets, shaped charges,
grenades, perforators, mines, and similar devices manufactures
exclusively for military or police purposes.” 46 Title 18 has is not
applicable to international law in and of itself and the language found
in Title 18 are not terms of art not found in any treaty or convention.
Instead, Title 18 concerns crimes and criminal procedure within the
military. 47 Furthermore, the section begins clearly stating that the
definition is “for the purposes of this subsection,” which essentially
limits the definition to only pertain to the part of the code for which
it was written. 48 Also, it is important to see how the United States
government defined “military device” in the past since the United
States government, along with the government of the United
Kingdom, own over half of the active UMVs in the world. 49
45.

See ASD Press Release, supra note 1.

46.

18 U.S.C. § 845(c)(3) (2006).

47.

18 U.S.C. § 845.

48.

18 U.S.C. § 845(c)(3) (2006).

49.

While the United States and the United Kingdom own 56% of the
UMVs in the world, the United States has the most active UMVs (196)
and the greatest number of UMV manufacturing companies. ASSOC. FOR
UNMANNED MAR. VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, UNMANNED MARITIME VEHICLES:
CORE CAPABILITIES & MARKET BACKGROUND 5 (2013).
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The definition makes sense for the current planned use and
development of UMVs when examined from the physical perspective
of the vehicle and the purpose and functionality of the vehicle.
Unmanned Marine Vehicles are launched, or cased away from their
ships. 50 The closest thing on the list that the definition provides is
“projectile.” Yet Merriam-Webster defines “projectile” as “a body
projected by external force and continuing in motion by its own
inertia.” 51 Because UMVs are launched off ships but ultimately
propelled by their own motors, this definition does not seem to fit.
However, the statute provides that the definition of “military device”
also applies to “similar devices manufactured exclusively for military
or police purposes.” 52
UMVs are being used for reconnaissance purposes as their primary
function. While the purposes aren’t exclusively for military purposes,
such as their research functions discussed earlier in this Note, they are
still owned by the Military. Furthermore, defining Unmanned Marine
Vehicles as “military vehicles” doesn’t have to strictly comply with
the definition in the United States Code; the Code merely serves as a
starting point in defining what these machines actually are. Based on
the similarities between the previous codification of this term and the
characteristics and purposes of the machines, conferring the status of
“military device” onto Unmanned Marine Vehicles makes more sense
than any previously suggested definition.
There is also a public policy argument to be made for defining
UMVs as “military devices.” That argument has to do with timing
and avoiding potential international conflicts. The amending process
for the COLREGS is time consuming and has to go through a number
of hurdles and group approval before they come into effect. Article VI
of the 1972 COLREGS map out the process for amending articles,
specifying a “2/3 majority of those present and voting in the
Maritime Safety Committee of the Organization,” and that the
amendment shall be communicated to “all Contracting Parties and
Members of the Organization at least six months prior to its
consideration by the Assembly.” 53 Because of the large number of
countries that have adopted the COLREGS, communication and
ratification could potentially take years. 54
When thinking of a hypothetical situation where a crash occurred,
or a UMV fired upon an innocent vessel, it would be extremely
difficult to determine how to treat the situation, and even harder to
50.

See USV Master Plan, supra note 8, at 33.

51.

Projectile, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003)

52.

18 U.S.C. § 845(c)(3) (2006).

53.

See COLREGS, supra note 12, at Art. VI.

54.

See IMO Procedure, supra note 24.
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investigate the circumstances if there was no defined legal status of
the UMV. Because time is of the essence UMVs must be defined in a
manner that ensures that there is status if anything is to go wrong.
The IMO recently recognized the fact that the amendment has the
potential to last for a number of years, and established procedure for
a “tacit acceptance” of amendments by the States that are part of
their Conventions. 55 This procedure specifies that instead of 2/3
approval of an amendment to become part of a Convention, the
“procedure provides that an amendment shall enter into force at a
particular time unless before that date, objections to the amendment
are received from a specified number of Parties.” 56 While this process
is much faster than the old 2/3 rules, there is still the time considered
for the Amendments to enter into force, which can usually take 18 to
24 months. 57 The technological advances that can happen in a twoyear period are great, and the likelihood that Unmanned Maritime
Vehicles will be in the ocean in that time is almost a certainty. Thus,
waiting for the IMO to adopt amendments is too risky, as leaving
UMVs without a status would complicate potential confrontation due
to an undefined device harming another ship. As such, liability for
Unmanned Marine Vehicles must also be established.

IV. Tort Liability of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles
UMVs are military property and have the ability to attack other
maritime vehicles. 58 The highly autonomous nature of UMVs coupled
with their groundbreaking technology leaves room for technological
error. Based on probability alone, it is likely that in the time that
UMVs are used, eventually one machine could malfunction and strike
a ship it was not meant to strike. 59 When such an event occurs, the
question of liability of UMVs will arise for the first time. Determining
liability in an accidental UMV attack will be difficult because of how
highly autonomous the machines are, and because of the level of
55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

See Joe Pappalardo, Thar She Drone: Are the High Seas Ready for
Robots?, POPULAR MECHANICS (Aug. 20, 2013, 2:57 PM),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/robots/tharshe-drones-are-the-high-seas-ready-for-robots-15829949

59.

Accidental strikes have not been uncommon since the military
implemented the drone program in the War on Terror. Recent mistakes
have occurred in air drones, which usually involve less autonomous
machines, mistaking civilians for their targets. See Air Strike Kills 15
Civilians in Yemen by Mistake: Officials, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/12/us-yemen-strikeidUSBRE9BB10O20131212.
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disconnect the machines have from human oversight. This section of
the Note presents a hypothetical: a UMV has attacked a civilian ship
or submarine, killed people on board, and has damaged the property
of a private ship owner. The section will then determine if a duty
exited, the elements of negligence, and establishing UMV liability.
A. Establishing a Duty of Care

It is concerning that UMVs will be navigating international water
without any direct human control. What is most concerning about
this idea is that there will be other ships in the water that the UMVs
will have to navigate around. Dealing in a hypothetical situation
where a UMV and a man-operated vessel collide, an analysis of the
liability of the parties would be first and foremost. It would be easier
to define the violation on part of the man-operated vessel because it
has to comply with the COLREGS. The COLREGS provide a
backdrop for analyzing a negligence or recklessness standard. 60 Courts
have held that when taking the liability of ship collisions into
account, Rule 8 (collision prevention), and Rule 13 (requiring
overtaking vessels to keep out of the way of vessels being overtaken)
are the proper sections of the COLREGS to weigh in analysis.61
Courts have also interpreted that the responsibility of avoiding a
collision is an authority that rests “upon the master alone,” the
commanding officer of the ship, rather than the navigator, in avoiding
liability on behalf of the vessel. 62
The relevant sections and rules of the COLREGS thus outline a
duty of care that vessels at sea must hold to each other in order to
avoid collisions. Different courts have decided how far this duty
extends. 63 The common theme in many rulings is that the duty of care
imposed on the person responsible for navigation depends on the
particular danger of the situation. 64 Courts have also been conscious
60.

Such a situation would result in a violation of Section B of the
COLREGS, which outline steering and sailing conduct. See COLREGS,
supra note 12, at sec. B.

61.

See Crowley Marine Servs. v. Maritrans Inc., 447 F.3d 719 (9th Cir.
2006).

62.

See The Madison, 250 F. 850 (2nd Cir. 1918).

63.

See generally Stephanie Showalter & Justin Manley, Legal and
Engineering Challenges to Widespread Adoption of Unmanned Maritime
Vehicles 2 (2009), available at IEEE Explorer.

64.

See Red Star Barge, Inc. v. Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 467
(2nd Cir. 1959); see also The Saratoga, 37 F. 119, 120-121 (S.D.N.Y.
1888) (“[I]f not wholly obscured, the vigilance of the lookout ought to be
proportionate to the danger; much stricter, therefore, than in the open
sea where vessels are few.”); see also Nicholes v. M/V Maya, 949
F.Supp. 391 (D.S.C. 1996) (“Rather, the persons in charge of the
vessel’s navigation are obligated to position a lookout at a point best
suited for that purpose, having due regard for the circumstances of the
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of the size of vessels, and have held that the level of duty can be
determined on factors such as size within a particular circumstance.65
In Capt’n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1982), a
case involving two ships of different sizes colliding into one another,
the 1st Circuit held that even though the Appellant’s argument of
how Appellee should have acted at sea created the safest situation, it
was an “unrealistic” requirement as a matter of law to impose on
“small fishing vessels with limited crews,” and that the “adequacy of
the lookout must be evaluated realistically in light of all the
circumstances.” 66
B. Establishing Negligence

The analysis of UMV liability presents a problem because these
courts have examined the liability of vessels in the backdrop of the
COLREGS, and UMVs are not within the scope of the COLREGS as
they are presently written. The first step would be to figure out if
UMVs have a duty at all to other ships at sea. UMVs will be mobile
devices that will be programmed by a technician. While the UMVs
have a high level of autonomy, this doesn’t mean that technicians
won’t keep the likelihood of a collision in mind. Considering those
factors, there is room for error when a new technology is thrust upon
an environment like the ocean.
The test for determining negligence varies between different
jurisdictions. However, there is a multi-factor test that California
adopted in Rowland v. Christian that is most frequently adopted by
other jurisdictions in the country. 67 That test involves seven elements:
(1) foreseeability of harm to plaintiff, (2) degree of certainty that
plaintiff suffered injury, (3) closeness of the connection between
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the moral blame
case and the conditions of the weather.”). Courts have also specified the
operation of sight and sound varies in different circumstance. See
Schmacher v. Cooper, 850 F.Supp. 438, 450 (D.S.C. 1994) (“Thus, the
duty of vessel operators to maintain a proper lookout by sight and
sound is enhanced if special circumstances warrant increased vigilance,
but not special look-out is necessary is a vessel pilot can see everything
that a bow pilot lookout could see.”).
65.

See Capt’n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1982).

66.

See id. at 166; see, e.g., McCarthy c. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d
1554, 1557-1558 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Unreasonable conduct is merely the
failure to take precautions that would generate greater benefits in
avoiding accidents than the precaution would cost… It is a bedrock
principal of negligence law that due care is that care which is optimal
given that the potential victim is himself reasonably careful; a careless
person cannot by his carelessness raise the standard of care of those he
encounters.”).

67.

See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty
Law in Microcosm, 91 B.U.L. REV. 1873, 1878 (2011).
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attached to defendant’s conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future
harm, (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved. 68
Most of these factors appear appropriate in a UMV negligence
analysis except for the moral blame prong. Because UMVs are
autonomous machines, attaching a morality standard to their conduct
would be misplaced because morality has traditionally been thought
of as a human concept. 69 It is too early in technological development
to extend such a concept to machines, so this element will not be
considered in the negligence analysis. 70
Thus, when looking at the hypothetical presented at the
beginning of this section, the first element to consider when
evaluating a UMV’s duty of care under this traditional tort theory
should be foreseeability of harm to another party at sea.
Foreseeability is a good factor in determining a negligence standard
for UMVs for several reasons. First, the new technology of the UMVs
is an important consideration since it is now innovative and has never
been tested in a real oceanic environment. While technology may
develop UMVs to unimaginable heights, at the moment the
technology is not as precise as a human eye and mind. For the time
being, until the UMV technology develops into another sphere of
accuracy, we can only compare it to human accuracy, which itself is
already subject to errors. With accuracy an issue, as well as
technological concerns of such a new and vast environment, it could
be reasonably foreseeable that a UMV could malfunction at sea and
cause another ship harm.
Establishing a degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the
injury may also be easier in this situation. If the UMV and civilian
vessel are within a great distance of each other, and knowing one of
these has weapons and the other doesn’t, establishing that degree of
certainty would just involve drawing a circumstantial connection.
However, if the injury were resulting from a collision, more
environmental factors would have to be considered to find out what
else in the area could have collided with the plaintiff ship. This
analysis would also be key in establishing the third element, the
68.

Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113 (1968).

69.

But see Gary Marcus, Moral Machines, NEW YORKER, (Nov. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/ news/ news-desk/ moralmachines (explaining the growing concerns regarding autonomous
machine morality with respect to the safety of humans, and how
technology today is “a long way from constructing a robot that can fully
anticipate the consequences of any of its own actions (or inactions).”).

70.

Id.
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closeness of connection between the UMVs conduct and the plaintiff’s
injury, because aside from establishing if the UMV had weapons, a
greater inquiry would have to be made into the mission of the UMV
and drawing upon that, inferences as to why it attacked the civilian
ship.
The fourth element, the policy of preventing future harm, would
have to be examined through a national defense lens. Imposing
greater restrictions on UMVs could possibly result in less
reconnaissance activity and could put United States intelligence at a
disadvantage if an important front is compromised. However,
depending on where the UMVs are placed, limiting UMV movement
could be positive as to ensure they don’t further interfere with civilian
activity. Such an analysis hinges on the type of world where UMVs
are readily deployed, and have been for a period of time enough for a
possibility of civilian interference. These facts would also play a part
in the analysis of element five, the extent of the burden imposed on
the UMV and the consequences to the community for imposing the
duty of care. When such a time comes, the defense-lens balancing test
should be used to satisfy both of these elements.
The final element, the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved, should depend on how much money
the Department of Defense has put into UMVs, and how much extra
money it would cost to ensure that UMVs operate safely in a civilian
environment. Currently, the amount of money put into the UMV
program is rising, and is projected to rise for the next several years.71
Assuming that this trend continues, extra money for ensuring more
safety precautions on the machines should not be too high of a cost.
However, if costs get too high, contractors might not want to build
UMVs. This situation is unlikely due to the draw of the extremely
high budget of the Department of Defense. 72 Thus, in most
circumstances the likely outcome of this element would weigh in favor
of the plaintiff.

71.

See State Dept. Seeks Contractors for $1B in UAV Work, DEF. NEWS
(Sep. 11, 2012), http://www.defensenews.com/ article/20120911/
C4ISR01/309110003/State-Dept-Seeks-Contractors-1B-UAV-Work.

72.

The Department of Defense’s budget currently exceeds $525 Billion
dollars. See Department of Defense: The Budget for the Fiscal Year,
(last
visited
3/14/2014)
available
at
WHITEHOUSE.GOV
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/asse
ts/defense.pdf.
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C. Establishing Liability

There are a number of difficulties that present themselves further
in the negligence analysis because an accident involving UMVs
themselves could not possibly follow a reasonable person analysis.
There are several different options to pursue when determining who
should have been “reasonable” in a UMV accident. The analysis could
be similar to the COLREGS in that the commanding officer’s
reasonableness is measured alongside the accident. This would be a
more difficult standard to apply due to the UMV’s high level of
autonomy. The commanding officer could never have had any contact
with the UMV itself, and the accident could have taken place several
months after the UMV was deployed from its parent vessel.
Another option could make the technician responsible for
programming the UMV responsible under the reasonable person
standard. This could be an easier connection to draw because of the
time and detail technicians are expected to put into large-scale
defense projects. Further, it would be the last point of contact that
the UMV would have with respect to a human who could be
considered reasonable.
This could possibly be the end of the analysis; however, the fact
that the programmer would most likely be a defense contractor for
the Department of Defense would make establishing liability more
difficult. 73 In 1950, the Supreme Court held that “the government is
not liable under the Federal Torts Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service.” 74 The Court expanded and extended this
rule, known as the Feres Doctrine, in 1988 in Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., holding that government defense contractors are not liable for
injuries resulting from defective products manufactured for use under

73.

The Department of Defense recently sought contractors to work on
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and was prepared to spend over a billion
dollars over the next five years on contractor work. These Department
of Defense was looking for contractors to “own and operate the UVAs
while also taking care of logistics, repairs, and spare parts.” See DEF.
NEWS, supra note 70. The past history of contractor use, the rising
government interest in UMV research and development, and the rapidly
growing “drone” contractor market and diversification, make it highly
likely that the Department of Defense will hire contractors for UMV
usage. See Reportlinker Adds the Emerging UMV and UGV Markets
2009-2019, BUSINESSWIRE (Jul. 27, 2009) http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20090727005489/en/Reportlinker-Adds-Emerging-UMVUGV-Markets-2009-2019#.UyIU0xZCe2w.

74.

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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a government contract. 75 The Court then established a three-part test
in determining that “liability for design defects in military equipment
cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonable precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.” 76
In reality, it would be easy for a UMV contractor to meet the
specification of the test set in Boyle if they followed proper procedure.
The three-step test is not a difficult test to meet. Essentially, all the
contractor has to do is follow the government’s specification of the
machine’s functionality, and warn the government of possible dangers,
which an attorney in the contractor’s business probably has already
done. The key language here, as applied to UMVs, is “military
equipment.” If UMVs are defined as vessels, it would be hard for the
government to avoid liability and would probably result in long messy
litigation over the duty of care standard. However, if we define UMVs
as “military devices” then they automatically fall under the category
of products that meet this liability exception. The government has an
interest in avoiding lawsuits and liability especially over products as
new as UMVs. Thus, defining UMVs as “military devices” would be
consistent with the contractor exception listed in Boyle. Of course, if
the UMV failed and the contractor did not follow then the contractor
could be found liable under the duty of care analysis.

V. The Issue of Navigation
Perhaps one of the greatest, and perhaps most practical, concerns
of most international and academics in the field of international law is
how Unmanned Marine Vehicles will safely navigate the ocean.
Unmanned Maritime Vehicles may use cutting edge technology to
navigate the waters, but their lack of immediate human control while
in the ocean presents not only a definitional problem, but a
navigational problem as well.
Aside from the definitions discussed in Section III of this Note,
when reading the language of the rules to the COLREGS, the
language indicated that the regulations were written with mancontrolled marine vehicles in mind. In part 5 of the regulations,
defining look-out requirements, the rules state that “every vessel shall
at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as by all
available means appropriate…” 77 Not only do the definitions listed in
75.

The Court reasoned that this applies when the government’s unique
interest in its federal contracts pre-empted state tort law. Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).

76.

Id. at 512.

77.

See generally COLREGS, supra note 12 at rule 5.
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the regulations assign each vessel a human navigator, but the
navigations itself is supposed to adhere to navigation and safety
provisions based on human characteristics. 78 Bearing the advanced
navigation capabilities of UMVs in mind, the COLREGS are not the
appropriate means of regulating UMV activity at sea, and the
machines should be held to a different standard of conduct.
A. Navigation Requirements under the COLREGS

As mentioned above, the COLREGS are international rules
promulgated by the International Maritime Organization that dictate
the proper means of navigation and safety of ship traffic on the high
seas. 79 The COLREGS are split up into 5 parts labeled A-E: general
provisions, steering and sailing rules, lights and shapes, sound and
light signals, and exemptions. 80 There are also four Annexes to the
articles that discuss positioning and technical detail of lights and
shapes, additional signals for fishing vessels fishing in close proximity,
technical details of sound signal appliances, and distress signals. 81 For
the purposes of this Note, only part B (steering and sailing rules) and
Part D (sound and light signals) will be discussed in relation to
Unmanned Marine Vehicles.
1. Part B: Steering and Sailing Rules

Part B of the COLREGS outlines the steering and safety rules of
the regulations, and is divided into three parts: conduct of vessels in
any condition of visibility, conduct of vessels in sight of one another,
and conduct of vessels in restricted visibility. 82 In total, the section
has 16 different rules outlining the proper conduct for vessels steering
clear of other vessels. 83
Section I of Part B, the rules outlining the conduct of vessels in
any condition of visibility, is mainly concerned with the speed of
vessels. There is also a rule in this section that outlines the
responsibilities of a vessel’s lookout. 84 Rule 6 outlines measures to
ensure safe speed so a vessel “can take proper and effective action to
78.

The usage of the words “sight” and “hearing” denote human
characteristics of observation. See id. at rule 5.

79.

See generally COLREGS, supra note 12.

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

See generally COLREGS, supra note 12, at part B.

83.

Id.

84.

Rule 5 states that vessels “shall at all times maintain a proper look-out
by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the
prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of
the situation and of the risk of condition. See id. at rule 5.

423

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Legal Status of Autonomous Unmanned Maritime Vehicles

avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to
prevailing circumstances and conditions.” 85 Rule 7 states that in order
to avoid the risk of collision, vessels shall use “means appropriate to
the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of the
collision exists,” not to assume a risk based on “scanty information,
especially radar information.” 86 Rule 8 details actions to avoid
collisions, which should be “positive, made in ample time and with
due regard to the observance of good seamanship,” which includes
alternating the course “large enough to be readily apparent to another
vessel observing visually or by radar.” 87
Section II of Part B deals with the conduct between vessels that
are in sight of one another. Most importantly, Rule 18 in this section
outlines the responsibilities between vessels. The rules state that both
power-driven vessels and sailing vessels shall keep out of the way of
vessels not under command, a vessel restricted in her ability to move,
and a vessel engaged in fishing. 88 Rule 14 states that vessels engaged
in head-on situation shall avoid collisions by passing each other on the
“port side” of the ship (left side), and when there is doubt as to the
occurrence of a head-on collision, it should be assumed that the
collision will occur. 89
Section III of Part B, the conduct of vessels in restrict visibility is
made up of only Rule 19. This rules states that in restricted visibility,
vessels shall “proceed at safe speeds,” use radar to determine if a
close-quarters situation exists in low visibility conditions, and this if a
risk of collision exists, to use a beam from a fog signal to another
vessel in order to avoid a collision. 90

85.

The rule outlines the following factors that determine a safe speed: state
of visibility, traffic density of the water, maneuverability of the vessel,
the state of wind, sea and current, and proximity of hazards, the
draught in relation to the available depth of water, and at nighttime,
the presence of background light. See id. at rule 6.

86.

The rule also outlines the following determinations for assessing if a risk
exists: if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not
appreciably change, and sometimes “when an appreciable bearing
change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a
tow or when approaching a vessel at close range.” See id. at rule 7.

87.

Id. at Rule 8.

88.

Id. at rule 18.

89.

Id. at rule 14.

90.

Id. at rule 19.

424

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Legal Status of Autonomous Unmanned Maritime Vehicles

2. Part D: Sound and Light Signals

Part D of the COLREGS is made up of six rules defining the
proper us of sound and light signals at sea. 91 Rule 33 explains the
proper equipment for sound signals: vessels under 12 meters need a
whistle, and vessels of 20 meters or more need a bell and a whistle,
and a vessel of 100 meters or more need a gong, whistle, and bell.92
Rule 34 outlines proper maneuvering and warning signals. The rule
requires “power-driven vessels” to indicate warning signals to
oncoming ships through blasts and light flashes, with the number of
blasts and light flashes each signaling different directions the
oncoming vessel. 93 Rule 35 outlines the proper signaling procedures
when vessels are in areas of restricted visibility. Approaching vessels
are required to use “no more than 2 minute prolonged blasts” to warn
other ships in conditions of low-visibility. 94
When the technicalities and procedural steps of these rules are
fully read and explained, it is apparent that there is more for ships to
do than simply avoid colliding into other ships by maintaining proper
lookouts. The biggest challenge in making UMVs compatible with the
COLREGS is making sure that the machines are autonomous enough
to comply with every step of these rules.
B. Navigation of UMVs

Compared to everyday technology, Unmanned Marine Vehicles
reflect a great advance in technological progress. Even though these
vehicles represent a new level of modern military technology, there is
still great concern that they will not be able to comply with the
COLREGS as they have been written. 95 Recently there has been
91.

The section begins with rule 32: Definitions, which defines: “whistle” as
“any sound signaling appliance capable of producing the prescribed
blasts,” “short blast” as “ a blast of about one second’s duration,” and a
“prolonged blast” as “a blast of from four to six seconds’ duration.” See
COLREGS, supra note 12, at 32(a).

92.

The gongs on the 100 meter sized vessels need a tone that cannot be
confused with the sound of the bell. The bell or the gong can be
replaced “by equipment having the same respective sound
characteristics.” See id. at rule 33.

93.

Id.

94.

Power-driven vessels, vessels not under command, sailing vessels, and
towing vessels are required to follow the 2 minute prolonged blast
requirement. Vessels at anchor are required to ring their bell “rapidly”
for about 5 seconds. See id. at rule 35.

95.

See generally NORRIS, supra note 17; see also USV Master Plan, supra
note 8, at 76 (Stating that the COLREGS must be taken into account in
“realizing” autonomous capabilities.).
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greater inquiry into the capabilities of Unmanned Marine Vehicles by
scientists who want to test the length of the machine’s autonomy;
from there a further assessment can be made if UMVs can be adapted
into the framework of the COLREGS.
There have been advances in the realm of programming UMVs for
autonomous function in accordance with the COLREGS. Recently,
three scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
designed a series of experiments to test the functionality of the
unmanned vehicles. 96 In their paper, these scientists provide a number
of different solutions to the problem of autonomous vehicles and the
human-oriented COLREGS. The scientists propose what they call a
solution based on Interval Programming Architecture, which they
describe as “behavior-based control with interval programming.”97
What this means is that the programming element of the UMVs will
be based on a mixture of pre-programmed actions, (long term decision
making) and a decision making capability based on situations that the
vehicle will get into once it is out in the ocean. 98
The scientists then applied this proposed solution in a few
common situations (under major COLREG rules) that the vehicle
could possibly get into, such as crossing and head-on collision
behavior 99 The scientists show that the is a way to prevent these
collisions. They make the UMV sensitive to other vehicles within
certain degrees of the UMV itself, and have the vehicle go into a
different direction if it’s approaching another vehicle. 100 While these
advances are impressive and could ultimately dictate how UMVs
universally function in the future, the developers at MIT are
concerned about the “robustness of this method.” 101 The scientists
who developed the Interval Program architecture are also concerned
about the method’s efficiency in more complex navigation scenarios. 102

96.

Michael Benjamin et al., Navigation of Unmanned Marine Vehicles in
Accordance with the Rules of the Road, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 IEEE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ROBOTICS AND AUTOMATION, 3581
(2006).

97.

See id. at 3582.

98.

This will be based on “a scheme for representing functions of unlimited
form” and “a set of algorithms for finding the globally optimal
situation.” See id. at 3583.

99.

See id. at 3584.

100. The UMV makes this decision using “Waypoint Behavior,” rating
decisions higher that brings it closer to the next waypoint. This means
that the machine will pick a point, and from that point determine how
close another ship is using GPS. See id. at 3583–84.
101. Id. at 3586.
102. See Benjamin et al., supra note 95, at 3586.
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The scientists who developed the Interval Program acknowledge
themselves that the COLREGS’ rules are “heavily dependent on
human common sense in determining rule applicability as well as rule
execution,” especially in a situation determining when multiple rules
apply simultaneously. 103 The scientists came up with the term “Bread
and Butter Behaviors” to describe the multi-objective optimization
programming that could possibly solve complex situation. 104 The first
behavior, “Waypoint behavior,” assesses position of a UMV and
another vessel. For this behavior, the scientists developed GPS based
programming that for UMVs to figure out their positioning relative to
other vessels. 105
The second “Bread and Butter Behavior” is collision avoidance
behavior. The programming that the MIT scientists developed “differs
from COLGREGS behaviors only that it doesn’t care how collisions
are avoided.” 106 This is a major departure form the COLREGS
because Rules 6,7, and 8 detail extensively specific procedure and
maneuvering that vessels have to follow when avoiding collisions,
largely dependent on human behavior. 107 It seems as though the end
result of the study produced some of the first and finest technology
developed to ensure that UMVs follow a certain kind of etiquette at
sea, they are not compatible with the COLREGS.
Several other situations present themselves that the scientists in
the MIT study did not address. The first are the signaling rules in
Section D of the COLREGS. While scientists could possibly combine
GPS to send off sounds or light alerts, this doesn’t account for the
many months the UMVs will be spending at sea without human
intervention. When a fixture breaks on a vessel, humans know about
it and will fix it right away to ensure no rules are broken. However, if
something in the ocean damages a sounds or light fixture, and the
UMV doesn’t alert an oncoming ship, this opens up danger not only
to the other vessel but also to governments, especially the United
States government so long as their military contractor did not foresee
and warn about the possibility of a fixture breaking. UMV technology
is not yet developed enough to follow the COLREGS, and because
prematurely making UMVs comply with the COLREGS would
potentially open up a floodgate of litigation, UMVs should not be
made to comply with the COLREGS at this time. A possible solution
in the interim would be for nations who have UMVs to agree on
special rules governing their usage in relation to other ships.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3583.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 3584.
107. See COLREGS, supra note 13, at rules 6–8.
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IV. Conclusion
Unmanned Marine Vehicles should not be made to fit into the
COLREGS. As they are written, the COLREGS are too based on
human action and thought, and right now technology doesn’t have
the capability to mimic such foresight. International law cannot work
if there is no consideration and respect of rules other than your own,
and statutes and conventions are meaningless if governments do not
abide by them.
Defining UMVs as “military devices” would be consistent with
previous definitions of military devices and could shield the United
States from liability in the event of a tort at sea. UMV technology is
not compatible with the COLREGS as they are currently formed. One
day our technological advancements may grow leaps and bounds over
what we presently perceive possible, and on that day UMVs might be
autonomous to the point where their decision-making comes just as
easily as a vessel’s lookout. However, as the study at MIT shows, that
day is far ahead of us.
What is not far ahead is the practice and field use of UMVs. The
United States Navy keeps granting money to research teams to
develop machines that will last longer in the ocean and have greater
autonomy than military technology has ever seen. What responsible
countries that harness this great technology should develop is a
proper mechanism to regulate the usage of UMVs, which is realistic
and responsible. What exactly those rules will look like is only
speculation at this point.
UMV deployment is no longer a thing of the distant future; it will
be here sooner than we think. Assigning a proper definition to these
autonomous machines is the first step in an exciting and
groundbreaking journey into uncharted legal horizons.
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